Introduction to CnOpenData Environmental Administrative Penalty Data of Chinese Enterprises

Environmental administrative penalties refer to specific administrative sanctions imposed by environmental protection authorities on individuals or organizations committing general environmental violations in accordance with environmental regulations. These measures directly establish environmental administrative liabilities, encompassing various forms such as fines and production suspension orders, widely applicable to different environmental offenses. According to China's environmental protection laws, such penalties can only be executed by legally authorized environmental supervision agencies through statutory procedures.

Environmental administrative penalties exhibit the following key characteristics:

Subject of Administrative Penalty includes environmental administrative departments at or above county level, other legally authorized regulatory agencies, and people's governments at county level or higher. Notably, these entities can only exercise penalty authority within their jurisdictional scope as defined by environmental regulations.

Target of Penalty refers to regulated entities (units/individuals) that have violated environmental laws through pollution, environmental damage, or disruption of regulatory order. Non-regulated entities cannot be subject to such penalties.

Legal Basis for Penalty requires concrete violations of environmental legal provisions. Penalties apply exclusively to acts explicitly defined as punishable by environmental laws, adhering to the principle of "no penalty without explicit legal provisions".

CnOpenData has compiled environmental administrative penalty records of Chinese enterprises since the 21st century, containing critical fields such as enterprise name (企业名称), penalty date (处罚日期), penalty cause (处罚事由), and penalty authority (处罚单位), providing robust support for related research.

Temporal Coverage

2000-2023

Data Scale

Environmental Administrative Penalty Data of Chinese Enterprises

Field Display

Sample Data

Relevant Literature

Kong, Dongmin and Liu, Chenhao, 2023, "Centralization and Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from Personnel Authority Reform in China ", Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
Ke, Shaojing; Ma, Ouyang; Xu, Nianxing, 2023: "Spillover Effects of Competitors' Environmental Penalties: A Perspective from Corporate Green Innovation", Journal of Management Sciences in China, No. 6.

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