Against the backdrop of the further advancement of China's social credit system, credit has become a fundamental cornerstone for the functioning of the market economy. In practice, certain market entities engage in dishonest acts characterized by "having the ability to fulfill obligations yet refusing to perform duties determined by effective legal instruments" (commonly termed "laolai" or "deadbeat debtors"), severely undermining market order and the social credit environment. To regulate the governance of such conduct, the Supreme People's Court issued the Provisions on Publishing Information of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement (Judicial Interpretation [2013] No. 17) on July 16, 2013, which came into effect on October 1 of the same year. This marked the inception of the systematic institutional framework for dishonest persons subject to enforcement in China.

  It is crucial to distinguish between a "person subject to enforcement" (被执行人) and a "dishonest person subject to enforcement" (失信被执行人):

A person subject to enforcement refers to a party who refuses to comply with a court judgment or arbitral award after the statutory appeal period has expired or after a final judgment has been rendered. Following a civil litigation judgment in favor of the plaintiff, if the defendant fails to pay the compensation amount stipulated in the judgment within the legally prescribed time limit and thus faces court enforcement, the defendant is designated as the person subject to enforcement for that specific compulsory execution.

  Differing from the above definition:

Under the official definition, a dishonest person subject to enforcement refers to a person subject to enforcement who has the capacity to fulfill their obligations but fails to perform the duties determined by an effective legal instrument, and who falls under any of the following circumstances, thereby warranting inclusion in the list of dishonest persons subject to enforcement:
(a) Obstructing or resisting enforcement through methods such as fabricating evidence, violence, or threats;
(b) Evading enforcement through false litigation, false arbitration, concealing assets, transferring property, or other means;
(c) Violating the property reporting system;
(d) Violating orders restricting high-consumption activities;
(e) Refusing to perform an enforcement settlement agreement without justifiable reasons;
(f) Other circumstances involving the capacity to fulfill obligations but refusing to perform duties determined by effective legal instruments.

  The data on dishonest persons subject to enforcement compiled by CnOpenData, based on the aforementioned framework, enables systematic analysis of the distribution characteristics, behavioral patterns, and evolutionary trends of this group in China. It serves as a vital foundational resource for research on social credit governance, judicial enforcement efficiency, and market credit risks.

Time Coverage

By Publication Date: 2013 - June 30, 2025

Field Display

Sample Data

Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement (Legal Entities)

Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement (Natural Persons)

Related Literature

  • Yu Yongze, Guo Menghua, Hu Shan, 2020: "Social Dishonesty Environment and the Growth of Private Enterprises: Empirical Evidence from City-Level Dishonest Persons," China Industrial Economics, No. 9.
  • Dai Yiyi, Zhang Pengdong, Pan Yue, 2019: "More Deadbeats, Harder Loans? Evidence from Regional Integrity Levels and Bank Borrowing by Listed Companies," Journal of Financial Research, No. 8.
  • Yang Guochao, Pan Yuzhang, 2019: "Is Trust Priced? Evidence from the Bond Market," Journal of Financial Research, No. 1.

Data Update Frequency

Annual Updates