考虑消费者损失厌恶的商品试用及质量评分披露机制研究

Abstract

When consumers lack information about new product quality, they hesitate to purchase due to loss aversion. New start-up firms can rely on third-party review platforms to conduct product trials, collect ratings from trialists, and thereby reduce the impact of product quality uncertainty on consumers' purchase intention. Besides genuine trials, firms may also conduct fake trials by hiring internet water armies at higher costs. This paper develops a model for new start-up firms conducting product trials, explores the characteristics of firms' optimal trial strategies, and investigates whether third-party review platforms can design rating disclosure mechanisms to curb firm fraud, and discusses the effects of such mechanisms. The study shows that review platforms can curb fraud by setting a rating display threshold: only when the number of ratings accumulated by a firm reaches the threshold will the third-party review platform disclose the rating. For the monopoly scenario with a small market size, such a mechanism is simple and effective, and it does not negatively affect honest firms. When the market size is large or competition exists, using the rating display threshold strategy alone often harms the interests of honest firms, making it difficult to implement. In this case, cooperation among multiple parties is needed, forming a joint force from three perspectives—reducing fraud gains, increasing fraud costs, and setting an appropriate rating disclosure mechanism—to jointly curb fraud.