投资者有限理性与基金营销策略——基金大比例分红的证据

Abstract

This paper examines the phenomenon of large-proportion dividends by mutual funds to illustrate how rational fund managers exploit the limited rationality of fund investors to expand fund size and maximize their own interests. Theoretically, funds should avoid dividends to prevent size reduction; however, in practice, funds began to pay large-proportion dividends consecutively from 2006. This paper proposes three hypotheses to test this phenomenon: the 'signaling' theory, the 'catering' theory, and the 'limited attention' theory. We find that after funds paid large-proportion dividends, net fund inflows increased by more than 200%, fund marketing expenses rose substantially, and large-proportion dividends also alleviated the 'redemption anomaly' of fund investors, indicating that large-proportion dividends are a marketing strategy. Our evidence shows that the large-proportion dividend phenomenon is not explained by the 'signaling' theory or the 'catering' theory applicable to stock dividends, but supports the 'limited attention' theory, which offers implications for future theoretical research on fund and stock dividends. This study raises new thoughts on the regulation of various behaviors arising from differences in market participants' rationality, providing a new perspective for research on investor protection.