分析师跟踪对企业产品质量违规的影响研究

Abstract

Taking Chinese A-share manufacturing listed companies as a sample, this paper examines the impact of analyst coverage on corporate product quality violations. The study finds that the greater the number of analysts covering a firm, the lower the probability and frequency of product quality violations. Mechanism tests show that analysts exert an external monitoring role on management by inquiring about product quality information during site visits, prompting them to improve product quality management practices, thereby curbing product quality violations. Further analysis reveals that the inhibiting effect of analyst coverage is more significant when analysts have industry expertise, hold higher reputations, or are geographically closer to the company. By revealing the supervisory role of analyst coverage on corporate product quality violations, this paper provides useful insights for China's product quality regulatory authorities to explore pathways using capital market information intermediaries to address corporate product quality issues, thereby safeguarding public interests and fostering high-quality economic development.