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Regulatory Penalties and Commercial Banks' Human Capital Investment in Risk Control Positions
监管处罚作为商业银行重要的外部监督机制,能否推动其风险管理组织体系中人力资本结构的适配性调整?本文研究发现,我国商业银行分支机构在受处罚后显著提高了风控人员的招聘比例。机制检验表明,监管处罚借助监管压力效应和声誉损失效应,对银行业绩和市场表现产生负面影响,进而促使其增加风控岗位的人力资本投入。该投入主要受信贷类、治理类处罚以及与风控失职相关的处罚驱动,且招聘岗位要求呈现高学历、高经验和高技能特征,说明监管处罚通过揭示风控缺陷,推动银行借助风控人力资本优化手段进行针对性整改和修复。异质性分析表明,业务扩张速度较慢与位于人才供给相对充足地区的受处罚银行更可能增加相关投入。进一步地,受处罚银行招聘风控人员不仅有助于减少后续监管处罚、提升自身风险防范能力,更产生了正向溢出效应——带动同地区未受处罚银行提升风控人力资本配置。本文揭示了监管处罚如何驱动商业银行增加人力资本投入,进而推动其建立健全风控体系的作用机制。本文结论凸显了风控岗位人力资本在银行治理中的关键作用,拓展了金融监管发挥微观治理效应的路径,为提升监管政策效能、推动银行业实现高质量发展提供了有益启示。
Abstract
As an important external oversight mechanism for commercial banks, do regulatory penalties drive corresponding adjustments in the human capital structure within their risk management systems? This study finds that following regulatory penalties, branches of Chinese commercial banks significantly increase the proportion of their recruitment dedicated to risk control personnel. Mechanism analysis indicates that regulatory penalties undermine banks' financial and market performance via regulatory pressure and reputational loss, which in turn motivates them to augment human capital investment in risk control positions. The increased hiring is mainly driven by credit- and governance-related penalties and penalties stemming from risk control negligence; the relevant positions generally require high educational qualifications, extensive experience, and professional skills, indicating that regulatory penalties expose human capital deficiencies in risk control positions and motivate banks to implement targeted remediation through optimizing their risk control workforce. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that penalized banks with slower business expansion and those located in regions with sufficient talent supply are more inclined to increase such investment. Furthermore, hiring risk control personnel not only assists penalized banks in reducing subsequent regulatory penalties and enhancing their risk management, but also generates a positive spillover effect—driving unpenalized banks in the same region to increase their own hiring of such staff. This study reveals how regulatory penalties drive commercial banks to increase human capital investment, thereby promoting the establishment of a sound risk control system. It highlights the critical role of human capital in risk control positions in bank governance, expands the pathways through which financial supervision exerts micro-level governance effects, and provides useful insights for enhancing the effectiveness of regulatory policies and promoting high-quality development in the banking sector.
监管处罚显著提升银行风控岗位人力资本投入
以2015-2021年132家商业银行的824个分支机构为样本,采用OLS回归发现,监管处罚次数每增加1个标准差,风控岗位人力资本投入(风险合规类职位发布比例)相对均值增加11.8%,支持研究假说H1a。
监管处罚降低银行业绩和市场表现
机制检验显示,监管处罚显著降低资产息税前收益率(EBITDA)、资本充足率(CAR)、贷款增长率(LoanGrowth)和市场势力(Lerner),说明监管处罚通过监管压力和声誉损失损害银行绩效,进而激发其增加风控人员招聘的动机。
信贷类和治理类处罚驱动风控人力资本投入
区分处罚类型发现,仅信贷类处罚(系数0.017,1%显著)和治理类处罚(系数0.012,5%显著)显著增加风控人员招聘,程序性处罚和其他处罚影响不显著,且风控失职相关处罚对应层级匹配岗位招聘。
招聘岗位呈现高学历、高经验和高技能要求
监管处罚显著提高要求本科以上学历(F1.RJEdu3,系数0.010)、3年以上经验(F1.RJExp3,系数0.006)及软硬技能兼备(F1.RJSkill2,系数0.009)的风控职位发布比例,表明银行通过提高门槛优化风控人力资本配置。
风控人员招聘减少后续处罚并产生溢出效应
经济后果检验表明,风控人员招聘比例提高显著改善银行后续受处罚情况(F1.Improvement系数2.125,1%显著),降低银行风险承担;且同地区其他受处罚银行的行为促进未受处罚银行增加风控招聘,显示正向溢出效应。
核心解释变量
监管处罚(Frequency):商业银行分支机构在t年受到的监管处罚次数加1取自然对数;替代变量包括是否受罚(Dummy)和处罚金额(Amount)
被解释变量
风控岗位人力资本投入(F1.RiskJob):商业银行分支机构在t+1年发布的'风险合规'类职位占所有职位的比例
样本与数据
2015-2021年我国132家商业银行(5家大型国有、11家股份制、88家城商行、28家农商行)的824个分支机构,观测值2600个;招聘数据来自51job(2016-2022年),财务数据来自CNRDS和CSMAR,处罚信息来自原银保监会,宏观经济数据来自中国城市统计年鉴
识别方法 / 模型设定
采用OLS模型控制分支机构固定效应和年份固定效应;使用双重差分(以2020年'金融科技创新监管试点'为准自然实验)、工具变量法(原银监会总部接近度交互项)处理内生性;PSM和熵平衡匹配处理样本选择性偏差
内生性及稳健性检验
替换被解释变量(职位数量)、替换解释变量(是否受罚、处罚金额)、更换城市-年份固定效应、调整研究样本、验证非风控类职位无显著变化以排除劳动力普遍短缺解释