Environmental administrative penalties refer to specific administrative sanctions imposed by environmental protection authorities in accordance with environmental regulations on individuals or organizations committing general environmental violations. These measures directly establish environmental administrative liabilities, encompassing various forms such as fines and production suspension orders. They are widely applicable to diverse environmental violations. According to China's environmental laws and regulations, such penalties can only be imposed by administrative agencies legally empowered with environmental supervision authority through statutory procedures.

  Environmental administrative penalties exhibit the following key characteristics:

• Subject imposing penalties: Environmental administrative departments at or above the county level, other administrative departments exercising environmental supervision authority as prescribed by law, and people's governments at or above the county level. Crucially, these entities may only exercise penalty powers within their legally defined supervisory scope; otherwise, such actions constitute violations.
• Target of penalties: Counterparties in environmental administration—specifically, units or individuals whose actions violate environmental regulations, resulting in environmental pollution, damage, or disruption of normal regulatory order. Penalties cannot be imposed on non-administrative counterparties.
• Prerequisite for penalties: The counterparty must have committed acts violating environmental regulations. Penalties apply exclusively to behaviors explicitly defined as punishable under environmental laws ("No penalty shall be imposed without explicit legal provisions").

  CnOpenData has compiled environmental administrative penalty records in China since the 21st century, containing fields such as enterprise names, penalty dates, violation reasons, and imposing authorities, thereby facilitating related research.

---

Time Coverage

2000-2023 (Updatable upon request)

---

Data Scale

---

Field Display

---

Sample Data

---

Relevant Literature

• Kong, Dongmin and Liu, Chenhao, 2023, "Centralization and Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from Personnel Authority Reform in China ", Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
• Ke, Shaojing; Ma, Ouyang; Xu, Nianxing, 2023, "Spillover Effects of Competitors' Environmental Penalties: Evidence from Corporate Green Innovation Perspectives", Journal of Management Sciences in China 6. (Original: 柯劭婧、马欧阳、许年行，《竞争对手环保处罚的溢出效应研究——基于企业绿色创新的视角》，《管理科学学报》第6期)

---

Data Update Frequency

Annual updates