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A-share listed companies green patent details table

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 &Regulatory inquiry letters refer to formal communications issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) when reviewing listed companies' announcements. Should deficiencies falling short of "direct regulatory standards" (typically manifested as inaccurate or incomplete information disclosure) be identified, the exchanges will issue inquiry letters addressing events such as financial reports, mergers and acquisitions, related-party transactions, abnormal stock price fluctuations, and media-reported social hotspots. These letters explicitly cite specific provisions of relevant regulatory rules, requiring listed companies to provide explanations, supplementary disclosures, or error corrections within a stipulated timeframe by cross-referencing the cited provisions with their own actions. Alternatively, they may require opinions from the listed companies' legal or financial advisors. Both the issuance and responses to such letters must be promptly disclosed by listed companies. Should persistent inaccuracies or omissions in disclosure remain, the exchanges may issue secondary or even tertiary inquiry letters. This regulatory mechanism, centered around inquiry letters, constitutes a vital instrument for the daily supervision of listed companies by Chinese stock exchanges.

  The widespread adoption of the inquiry letter system originated from the 2013 Express Train Reform of information disclosure. Post-reform, the regulatory focus of exchanges on listed companies' financial reports shifted from ex-ante to ex-post supervision, with inquiry letters emerging as a primary channel for ex-post oversight. It is evident that inquiry letters serve as a crucial mechanism for enhancing information disclosure. Their timeliness and specialized nature enable an understanding of the exchanges' regulatory scope and intensity towards listed companies, facilitate analysis and assessment of corporate governance capabilities and potential risks of relevant firms, and influence decision-making by stakeholders.

  The CnOpenData platform's database on regulatory inquiry letters for A-share listed companies comprehensively covers SSE inquiry letters, as well as SZSE inquiry letters and their corresponding responses. This provides a robust data foundation for case studies and large-sample empirical research.


Time Coverage

All data available until June 30, 2025


Field Display

Fields for SSE Regulatory Inquiry Letters for A-Share Listed Companies

Fields for SZSE Regulatory Inquiry Letters for A-Share Listed Companies


Sample Data

Sample Data for SSE Regulatory Inquiry Letters for A-Share Listed Companies

Sample Data for SZSE Regulatory Inquiry Letters for A-Share Listed Companies


Related Literature

  • CHEN Yunsen, DENG Yilu, LI Zhe, 2018: Does Non-Punitive Regulation Convey Information? Evidence from Regulatory Inquiry Letters, Journal of Financial Research, No. 4.
  • CHEN Yunsen, DENG Yilu, LI Zhe, 2019: Effectiveness of Front-Line Supervision by Stock Exchanges: Evidence from Financial Report Inquiry Letters, Management World, No. 3.
  • LI Xiaoxi, YANG Guochao, RAO Pingui, 2019: Do Stock Exchange Inquiry Letters Have a Regulatory Effect? Textual Analysis Based on M&A Restructuring Reports, Economic Research Journal, No. 5.
  • ZHANG Junsheng, TANG Xiaojian, LI Guangzhong, 2018: Can Preventive Regulation Suppress Stock Price Crash Risk? A Study Based on Annual Report Inquiry Letters from Stock Exchanges, Journal of Management Sciences in China, No. 10.

Data Update Frequency

Annual update